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Nonduality in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa: 
A Theological Reflection
Joseph s. o’Leary
The perfecTion of wisdom sutras teach that all dharmas are empty, and as such are all the same, so that in the end any efforts to establish dis-
tinctions between them are delusive and futile. Conze offers a brief summary 
of a characteristic long-drawn-out, repetitive development in The Large 
Sutra on Perfect Wisdom: “It is because of the nonbeingness of form, etc., its 
emptiness, its isolatedness, its lack of own-being, that a Bodhisattva does not 
approach [it] from either beginning, end, or middle. Because form, etc., can-
not be apprehended in nonbeingness, emptiness, isolatedness, or in lack of 
own-being. Nor is nonbeingness one thing, emptiness another, isolatedness 
another, lack of own-being another, one thing, a Bodhisattva another, form, 
etc., another, beginning, end, and middle another; but all these are not two 
nor divided. And that should be done for all dharmas.”1 This summary fails 
to convey the power of the sutra’s repetitions, which in meditative recitation 
track down substantializing and dualistic notions to their last hiding-place.
The emptiness and sameness of all dharmas is also a basic theme of the 
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa,2 driven home this time not by exhaustive repetition but 
by paradoxical utterances and gestures that enact nonduality. It is because 
1 Conze 1990, p. 190. This laconic summary corresponds to no less than 42 quarto pages 
in Kimura 2009, pp. 1–42.
2 For the Sanskrit text of this work, discovered by Professor Hisao Takahashi of Taisho 
University in July 1999, see Takahashi 2006. Published online by University of the West, 
Rosemead, CA, in the “Digital Sanskrit Buddhist Canon.” Paul Harrison, Luis Gómez, and 
others are working on an English translation of this text.
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of these that one of the sutra’s titles is given as yamaka-puṭa-vyatyasta-
nihāram, “production of couplets and inversions.”3 Nonduality provides the 
basic tonality for all the events and discussions in the text, none of which can 
be properly understood without the breakthrough to nondual insight.
Writing on the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa for Catherine Cornille’s series Chris-
tian Commentaries on Non-Christian Sacred Texts, I seek points of contact 
between Buddhist nonduality and the New Testament. Stepping back from 
the most sweeping declarations of the Buddhist texts, I note that on a more 
practical and prosaic plane, nonduality works on actual painful dualisms. 
Nonduality is never simple identity. Indeed it is always paradoxical, for it 
declares an intimate conjunction between what appear to be fundamentally 
opposed—in Buddhism, emptiness and form, nirvana and samsara, wis-
dom and compassion; in Christianity, the conjunction of divine power and 
human weakness, and of “dying with Christ” and “walking in newness of 
life,” or of the eternal divine Word and the suffering flesh of a human being; 
in Western philosophy, subject and object, spirit and matter. In various ways 
the New Testament, especially in the Pauline and Johannine writings, works 
to overcome sterile and paralyzing dualisms, and in doing so finds itself 
aligned with Buddhism, though it is not at all clear how far this affinity 
goes, and to what extent each of the traditions may be called on to formu-
late a radical critique of the other.
The nonduality of wisdom and compassion is perhaps the most accessible 
form of nondual thinking in Buddhism. It addresses the practical problem 
of reconciling contemplative withdrawal to the forest with active involve-
ment in the affairs of the village. But it also tackles a deeper ontological 
problem: since wisdom teaches us that beings have no real existence, how 
can we seriously express compassion for these non-existent entities? The 
Prajñāpāramitā Sutra in twenty-five-thousand verses presents this as the 
greatest difficulty for bodhisattvas. To lead beings to awakening is like 
attempting to discipline or dispute with space, for, like space, the beings 
exhibit the character of isolatedness, emptiness, insubstantiality, and van-
ity. If, having understood this, “a Bodhisattva does not lose heart, feels no 
despondency and does not tremble in his mind, then he courses in perfect 
wisdom.”4 But when he or she “surveys all dharmas from emptiness, and 
3 Takahashi 2006, chapter 12, section 23. Also at chapter 12, section 17: yamaka-
vyatyasta-nihāra-pada-puṭa. Puṭa is the name of a meter (Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English 
Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon, 1979, p. 631b). Yamaka is “the repetition in the same stanza of 
words or syllables similar in sound but different in meaning, paronomasia” (Ibid., p. 846c).
4 Conze 1990, p. 463.
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does not abandon any being,” the bodhisattva becomes “a refuge to those 
without refuge, a shelter of the defenseless, the final relief of those who are 
without one.”5 To Western readers this is a recondite issue, yet it lies at the 
heart of Mahayana Buddhism. The paradox, like all the paradoxes in the 
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, is generated by the doctrine of emptiness, and its solu-
tion is also found in that doctrine.
The linguistic performance of the text, with its sometimes shocking para-
doxical statements, is founded in the ideal of the rhetorical dexterity of the 
enlightened bodhisattva, a master of language because of his freedom of 
vision. The Avataṃsaka Sutra lists skill in yamaka (“couples”) and vyatyasa 
(“inversions”) among the bodhisattva’s attainments, and links it with the 
ability to manifest the ways of samsara and to ripen all beings while abiding 
in nirvana, where there are no beings: “The bodhisattva is skillful in couples 
and inversions for, insofar as he plays with the knowledges and has obtained 
the excellence of the perfection of knowledge, he is able, while relying 
on nirvana, to manifest the ways of samsara; though possessing a domain 
entirely without beings, he does not cease to bring beings to ripeness.”6
My commentary will focus on these paradoxes, which I shall attempt to 
set in relationship to the Pauline and Johannine paradoxes concerning the 
relation of Jesus and the Father, the death and glorification of Christ, and 
the justification of the sinner. These can be unified under the broad heading 
of the paschal relationship of humanity and divinity, the drama in which 
human mortality and sinfulness are transformed by divine life and grace. 
Both sets of paradoxes point to the core concern of their respective tradi-
tions. In both cases we are dealing with ultimate reality, so that the effort 
to organize an interaction between the scriptural rhetoric of the Buddhist 
sutra on the one hand and New Testament texts on the other takes us into 
uncharted depths.
Throughout the centuries, Christianity has contrasted itself with alter-
native topographies of the spiritual world, notably the Neoplatonic One. 
Conflating the absolute simplicity of the One with the vibrant movement of 
the self-thinking Mind, which Plotinus had rigorously differentiated from 
it, Christian theology maintains that God is absolutely simple despite the 
infinity of his thoughts and activities and the processes and differentiations 
that go on within the divinity to give rise to a trinity of divine Persons. The 
resultant picture of God is less forbidding than that of the self-sufficient 
5 Conze 1990, p. 464.
6 Quoted in Lamotte 1987, p. 35.
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One, so utterly simple that it cannot be said to “think” or even to “be.” But 
divine simplicity has in the process lost its teeth. It becomes merely a nega-
tive warning against positing some kinds of differentiation in God, such as 
a difference of potency and act, or of part and part. Each of the three divine 
Persons is the one absolutely simple God, despite their distinction and their 
relations of procession.
Christianity might embrace Buddhist nonduality in the same way it 
embraced Plotinian simplicity, stretching it to accommodate the dualities 
of human and divine, sin and righteousness, life and death that are presup-
posed even in its most paradoxical and apparently nondual utterances. A 
clear obstacle here is that though Buddhist samsara and biblical creatureli-
ness have much in common, the other “poles” of the nondual relationship, 
namely nirvana and God, are vastly different. Nirvana is impersonal, inac-
tive, and in Madhyamaka its “emptiness” breaks down any radical disjunction 
from samsara, which has the same empty texture; God is personal, active, 
and stands over against creatures as their transcendent ground. One might 
envisage a nirvanic emptying of the notion of God but one could hardly give 
nirvana the personal traits of the biblical Creator. A more promising locus 
for a Christian embrace of Buddhist nonduality may be found in the figure 
of the bodhisattva, often compared with Christ. If all the paradoxes of Chris-
tianity center on Christ, who is both true man and true God, those of Bud-
dhism center on the bodhisattvas, in whom samsaric and nirvanic existence 
are conjoined.
If Buddhist nonduality has vital relevance for Christian theology, it must 
be because the latter is suffering from painful dualisms for which it seeks 
healing in the former. Nonduality for nonduality’s sake, without any press-
ing urgency, is mere intellectual bookkeeping. What draws Christians to 
Buddhism is a chronic dissatisfaction with inherited frameworks of thought. 
Indeed many have moved over to Buddhism entirely, dispensing themselves 
from having to worry about the imponderable question of God.
Paul Knitter declares that for Christianity “dualism is the problem!” but 
gives initially a rather harmless-sounding account of what this means: “dual-
ism results when we make necessary distinctions, and then take these dis-
tinctions too seriously,” especially when we overstress the infinite distinction 
between God and the world.7 The Bible does indeed present a potentially 
oppressive dualism between good and evil, the way of death and the way 
7 Knitter 2009, p. 7.
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of life, reinforced in a Persian infusion with the dualisms of God and Satan, 
angels and devils, heaven and hell. The force of these dualisms is reduced 
by the unitary emphases in the Christian message, such as the stress on the 
inseparability or even identity of love of God and love of neighbor. The cen-
trality of the forgiveness of sins is another factor that breaks down alienation 
between God and humanity or among humans themselves, and creates a 
situation that prompts paradoxical nondual utterance.
Knitter is more exercised by the dualism between creation and a God who 
is totally other, infinitely transcendent. But if we think of God, with John the 
Evangelist, as “Spirit,” “Light,” “Love”8—which are not metaphysical defi-
nitions of God but name a “divine milieu”—or if with Augustine we con-
ceive God as Being, Truth, Life, the Good, intimately present to all souls, 
the internum aeternum9—then the dualism evoked by Knitter does not arise. 
To say that this intimately and universally present source of being, insight, 
goodness, and love is eternal, omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent, is 
not to posit a remote metaphysical entity but to name a phenomenon near 
at hand, while proscribing things that cannot appropriately be said about it. 
To be sure, Augustine’s contemplative vision may not have found its most 
appropriate expression in the metaphysical structures of his theology, and 
many have suspected a relapse into Manichean dualism in the darker pas-
sages of his writings on grace and predestination. Still, Augustine’s Confes-
sions remains the most influential Christian book after the New Testament, 
and the contemplative spiritual freedom he attained, thanks in large part to 
Plotinus, remains a central reference for Christian insight.
Knitter notes that nirvana and samsara are neither two nor simply one; their 
relationship can be described as “InterBeing.” He proposes that just as Bud-
dhism overcame a dualism between nirvana and samsara, Christianity might 
seek to conceive God and creation in a similar way, such that “God really 
depends on us.”10 That last phrase seems to me to rewrite nonduality in the 
flat terms of a democratic metaphysics, where considerations of mutual rela-
tionship of equals trump attention to the concrete visage of the biblical God. 
Buddhism does not formulate nonduality in such flat metaphysical terms, 
by claiming for instance that nirvana depends on samsara. Neither does the 
nonduality of “He who has seen me has seen the Father”11 make the Father 
8 Jn 4:24, 1 Jn 1:5, and 1 Jn 4:16, respectively.
9 Augustine, Confessions 9.10.
10 Knitter 2009, p. 23.
11 Jn 14:9.
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dependent on the human form of Jesus. Johannine nonduality concerns the 
unity between the carnal samsaric texture of human existence and the pres-
ence and manifestation of the divine in it. Metaphysical explications have 
always diluted the impact of this nondual awareness, whether in classic 
references to its basis in the consubstantiality of Father and Son and the 
hypostatic union of the Son with the human Jesus, or in modern efforts to 
interpret it as expressing a revisionist account of divine transcendence.
If a return to Johannine and Augustinian vision allays ethical and theo-
logical dualism so that it no longer constitutes a painful problem for Chris-
tian faith, does recourse to Buddhist nonduality become superfluous? Good 
Christian theology is itself an enterprise of nonduality, which Buddhist non-
duality can reinforce and enrich, joining forces with it against painful dual-
isms that arise where good theology does not hold sway, in sectarianism, 
dogmatism, fundamentalism, and other such forms of unskillfulness. Or 
does Buddhist nonduality challenge Christianity at a deeper level than this, 
soliciting a niggling dissatisfaction or unease at the heart of biblical faith—
a sense, which Jews and Muslims may also share, that the monotheistic 
construction of awareness of the divine or of ultimacy suffers from some 
painful inbuilt flaws that Buddhist insight may help to heal?12
Comedy and Nonduality
The Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa is remarkably good-humored for a major religious 
text. Like the Book of Job, it takes the form of a drama, and could even be 
staged as such, though the special effects might be daunting. Comedy is pro-
vided in particular by the self-bondage of Śāriputra and others who are baf-
fled by Vimalakīrti’s extraordinary freedom from limiting identity.13 A sense 
of humor may allay the shock caused by antinomian passages such as the fol-
lowing: “Take this food if, without seeing the Teacher, hearing the dharma, or 
serving the saṃgha, you become a monk under the six heretical teachers and 
follow their path.”14 Orthodoxy becomes a snare if we do not realize its emp-
tiness, and heresies become a salvific means if we handle them in full aware-
ness that they are empty. We should be ready to smile at both. Heresies break 
12 In addition to the many post-Auschwitz and death of God theologies, Daniel Sibony’s 
psychoanalytical study of the flawed origins of monotheism should be noted. See Sibony 
1997.
13 Interestingly, one of the earliest Sanskrit dramas, of which fragments survive, is the 
Śāriputraprakarana (Comedy of Śāriputra); see Bansat-Boudon 2006, p. xvi.
14 Takahashi 2006, chapter 3, section 17.
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the attachment to orthodox views, and if one does not lend them dogmatic 
weight they lead back to the wisdom of emptiness. The bodhisattva who fol-
lows them deconstructs them, just as by not insisting on orthodox views he 
shows their merely functional status. This might be applied to the perpetual 
wrangle between orthodox and unorthodox views in Christian tradition.
It is true that the antinomianism is piled on so relentlessly that our smile 
is likely to freeze, as in watching a Beckett or Pinter play: “If adopting the 
eight untoward conditions of life, you do not gain the auspicious conditions; 
if embracing the taints you do not attain purification; if you do not bring puri-
fication to your donors, but they fall into evil paths; if you join all the Māras; 
if you make the nature of all passions your own nature; cultivate hostility 
to all beings; slander all buddhas, as well as dharma and saṃgha; and never 
enter parinirvāṇa. . . .”15 We must suppose that what is being underlined 
here is the emptiness of all dharmas, such that their conventional ordering 
has no ultimate subsistence. One could tame this speech by reducing it to an 
almost banal counsel: “Be free from and unattached to all conventions even 
while observing them faithfully.” But the brunt of it is that the bodhisattva 
positively demonstrates and enacts emptiness by treating approved ideals 
lightly and taking up what is most disapproved in order to deconstruct it.
Williams writes “Such a statement may not strike the modern reader 
as exactly proper material for a stand-up comedian, but it plays upon the 
same themes of incongruity and improbability which have always been the 
comic’s stock-in-trade. . . . The destruction of distinctions . . . comes peril-
ously close to absolute anarchism and meaninglessness. . . . What prevents 
the sutra from becoming a counsel of despair is that ever present comic 
sense of incongruity.”16 Perhaps we should reach to Rabelais and Joyce to 
attune ourselves to the extravagance of such passages. If tragedy tends to 
build on massive oppositions of good and evil, life and death, joy and woe, 
heaven and hell, comedy is a more comprehensive school of nonduality. 
The comic hero is never perched sublimely above the common herd but is 
one with all humanity; offenses are dissolved in laughter or forgiveness; the 
frontier between dream and waking becomes porous (A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, The Tempest); gender distinctions become a matter of carnivalesque 
play and cross-dressing (As You Like It, Twelfth Night); the lightest things 
become serious and the most serious things light; wisdom can appear as 
folly and folly as wisdom. The duality between comedy and tragedy itself 
15 Takahashi 2006, section 18.
16 Williams 1990, pp. 93–94.
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breaks down; there are scenes of clowning in Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth, 
and Othello, to remind us that the tragic perspective does not enjoy absolute 
authority. Comedy is not a superficial adornment of human life, a distrac-
tion from its true essence, thought to be found in tragedy alone. Its role in 
dissolving fixated and dualistic perspectives makes it an agent of revelation 
as much as tragedy is. One might even say that it is more closely allied with 
religious vision, whether Buddhist or Christian, since the tragic cannot have 
the last word for these faiths. In comedies the last word is often forgiveness 
(The Winter’s Tale, Le Nozze di Figaro), so that they become parables of sal-
vation.
Does the Buddha’s smile have an equivalent in the Gospels, or must 
we imagine Jesus as forever sighing, frowning, and chiding? Some of the 
gospel parables have a streak of mischief in them, as they delight in over-
turning expectations. This is particularly the case with the stories unique to 
Luke’s Gospel, where the calculating soliloquies of the characters are fol-
lowed by a divine surprise.17 Hierarchies are inverted and outsiders become 
insiders in the inclusive community of the Kingdom. Perhaps comic nondu-
ality trumps tragic dualism in the final vision of the New Testament.
The Flowers of the Goddess
One of the most comic scenes in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa concerns a god-
dess who dwells in Vimalakīrti’s house and who, thrilled by his teaching, 
makes heavenly flowers rain on the assembly. These cling to the bodies of 
the śrāvakas but not to the bodhisattvas. Śāriputra protests: “Devī, these 
flowers are improper (akalpikāni).”18 It is because he is too conscious of 
his religious identity that Śāriputra cannot shake off the flowers and undo 
the shocking and embarrassing breach of the monastic vinaya, which for-
bad the use of garlands, ornaments, and perfumes. The goddess replies that 
the flowers are quite proper, kalpikāni, since they are neither imagined nor 
conceived, na kalpayanti na vikalpayanti; it is the elders alone who are 
imagining and conceiving them and it is precisely their fabrications and 
their discrimination that are improper for one who has renounced the world 
to live according to the dharma. The good religious are those who refrain 
from such improper imagining and conceiving. It is not the goddess who 
has tainted Śāriputra but the evil conceptions of his own heart.
17 See Lk 7:39; 12:18–19; 15:17–19; 16:3–4; 18:4, 11–12.
18 Takahashi 2006, chapter 6, section 8.
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In the Gospels likewise, it is from within that impurity comes,19 and 
Paul sees the painful nub of the Law in the commandment, “Thou shalt not 
covet.”20 The Pharisees fuss about improper externals, but what is truly 
improper is the inward disposition of their hearts.21 Does this build on a 
crude dualism of internal and external? No, because what comes to one 
from the outside can be transformed by its reception—as in the (non-biblical) 
adage, “to the pure all things are pure.” Externally inflicted suffering can be 
taken up as an object of heart-exercise, becoming redemptive for the Chris-
tian, and an occasion of unmasking its emptiness for a Buddhist. Moreover, 
the inwardness of the heart is immediately expressed in externals, both in 
words: “from the fullness of the heart the mouth speaks,”22 and in deeds: 
“doing the truth.”23 The evil deeds denounced in Mark 7:21–22 as “pro-
ceeding from within” are identical with the bad thoughts (hoi dialogismoi 
hoi kakoi) that they embody; the heart is not hidden away inside but dis-
played in public. The dualistic ways of thinking that lodge in Western meta-
physics—and that Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty sought to correct—have 
little support in scripture. The materialist reductionism that would reduce 
the phenomena of consciousness to physical processes in the brain is not a 
true overcoming of dualism, for it cannot do justice to the supreme reality 
of the “heart” as stressed throughout scripture. In Buddhism too, vijñāna, 
discriminating consciousness, is the most impressive of the skandhas, and 
four of the five skandhas belong to mind rather than matter. If the overcom-
ing of dualism in Buddhist thought gives itself a metaphysical form, in what 
is probably a falling-off from integral Buddhist vision, that metaphysics 
will be some form of idealism. The contrast between internal and external 
is also a source of the humor in the Gospels, as in the contrast between the 
self-inflated Pharisee and the humble publican.24
Śāriputra devotes great care and energy to brushing away the flowers but 
not to cleansing his mind of the conceptions that pollute it. Or perhaps he 
does devote energy to cleansing the mind, but in a way that generates dual-
ism. The heavenly flowers are a skillful means for revealing this. They do 
not stick to the bodhisattvas, who have cut off all conceptions. Likewise, it 
is on the fearful person that evil spirits take hold, and it is on those who fear 




23 Jn 3:21; 1 Jn 1:6.
24 Lk 18:11–12.
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the dangers of samsara that sense-objects take hold, whereas they can do 
nothing to one free from all fear of samsaric passions. Fear itself and not its 
alleged objects is what paralyzes.
When the Gospel eloquently urges us to lay aside anxiety,25 it is touching 
on this fundamental bondage to fearful imaginings. If “perfect love casts 
out fear,”26 it is not because one is so good and pure that one has nothing 
to fear, like the bodhisattvas to whom the flowers do not stick because they 
are free of every residual trace, vāsanā, of the passions. It is not merely 
that a saint, joyfully engaged in works of love, no longer projects the image 
of a jealous, judging God who inspires fear. Rather, fundamental trust in 
the God who is “greater than our hearts” and who “first loved us,”27 and 
compassionate openness to the neighbor in need (cf. 1 Jn 3:17) are acts of 
casting out fear in which love consists. Perhaps the vāsanā are not some-
thing like bad smells to be suppressed by obsessive cleansing rituals, but 
an inner disposition to fall back fearfully on egoistic worry. The love that 
casts out fear by the same token overcomes dualism—dualism between self 
and neighbor and dualism between God and the world. “God is love, and he 
who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him.”28
Absence of Basis
The heavenly flowers are no ordinary sense-objects, but what one might 
call flowers of emptiness, fitting expressions of wisdom, that a religion 
clumsily preoccupied with questions of form and status cannot appreci-
ate. For a bodhisattva, anything can become such a flower, which confirms 
Vimalakīrti’s teaching, earlier in the chapter, on the passions and their 
lack of basis. When Mañjuśrī asks, “What is the root of wholesome and 
unwholesome?” Vimalakīrti answers that their root is the assemblage of 
existences (satkāya); the root of this is desire and attachment; their root 
is incorrect conceptual thoughts, which in turn are rooted in erroneous 
notions. The root of erroneous notions is the lack of a substratum; and this 
lack has no root; that is why all dharmas rest on a root without basis.29 Just 
as in Derrida’s deconstruction, the last substantial reference is replaced by a 
play of referrals, a network of signifiers that never comes to rest in a foun-
25 Mt 6:25–34.
26 1 Jn 4:18.
27 1 Jn 3:20; 4:19.
28 1 Jn 4:16.
29 Takahashi 2006, chapter 6, section 5–6.
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dation in a last signified, so the quest for the basis of dharmas never reaches 
a solid foundation. One realizes that such a basis cannot be found and that 
one cannot make a solid foundation of that very absence of basis.
Thus it is imagination that gives the passions a deceptive solidity, just as 
it projects substantiality, svabhāva, onto all empty phenomena. Every pas-
sion is without object, without a basis in durable existence; the only matter 
of which a passion is made is the projections of imagination and the fixity 
of the concepts that give them illusory consistency. To realize this is a joy-
ful liberation; the conquest of passions, not by blind ascesis but by enlight-
ened analysis of their lack of basis, makes of them a school of emptiness. 
Hence the slogan: “Passions themselves are enlightenment.” Such is the 
paradox on which the Buddhist vision of nonduality is founded.
Every passion is ready to break down, due to its ontological inconsistency. 
The dyads whereby the passions keep up a semblance of existence—friend 
vs. foe, love vs. hate, good vs. bad—disappear like ghosts for the one who 
becomes aware of the sameness of dharmas, or the taste of the real, which 
has nothing to do with the bitterness of painful discriminations. This same-
ness or equality implies the identity of samsara and nirvana, for “there is 
nirvana only for one who imagines a samsara, and vice versa.”30 Nāgārjuna 
exposes the absence of basis of the passions in a logical dialectic. “If a 
lustful subject existed before lust (rāgā) and exempt from lust, lust would 
depend on that subject; given a lustful subject, there would be lust. Con-
versely, in the absence of a lustful subject, how could lust come to be?”31
One might look to Martin Luther for something analogous to this in 
Christian tradition. His language may often sound starkly dualistic, but we 
may read it against the grain to bring out a nondual significance that lends 
it a new coherence. Salvation, which for Luther consists essentially in the 
forgiveness of sins, or justification by faith in Christ, is designed for sin-
ners. Hence the paradoxical advice to Melanchthon: “sin boldly, but believe 
more boldly” ( pecca fortiter, sed crede fortius).32 Sin does not deconstruct 
of its own accord, or by reason of metaphysical insight into evil as a mere 
absence of being. Rather the sinner is transferred to Christ’s realm, where 
sin is no longer imputed, but becomes ruled rather than ruling, regnatum not 
regnans. The “joyful exchange” ( fröhlicher Wechsel) whereby the sinner 
is clothed in Christ’s righteousness while he takes on our sin has a nondual 
30 Viévard 2002, p. 210.
31 Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā 6. 1-2a. See also Siderits and Katsura 2013, pp. 65–67.
32 Cf. Luther, Epistle 501 to Melanchthon.
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aspect. The slogan simul iustus et peccator might seem to tear the subject 
painfully in two opposing directions, but it could be taken as the play of 
two perspectives on the same situation, comparable to the play of samsaric 
and nirvanic perspectives in a bodhisattva’s existence. If I look to myself, I 
am a sinner, lost; if I look to Christ, I am a saint, saved. If there is a nondual 
insight here it is established by an event of grace rather than by cool analy-
sis. Bodhisattva freedom and the freedom of those justified by faith have so 
much in common that one wonders if an affinity may also be found between 
the respective causes. The Buddhist analysis of sin as delusion leads to for-
giveness of all offenders and compassion toward them as caught in a web of 
delusion. The Christian overcoming of sin through forgiveness generates a 
wise insight into the emptiness and futility of evil that may rejoin Buddhist 
analyses. Forgiveness, in both religions, is an enactment of nonduality—
nonduality between the one who forgives and the one forgiven, to begin 
with, and then nonduality between divine forgiveness and human forgive-
ness or between the ultimate all-comprehending wisdom of buddhas and the 
compassionate understanding at the heart of human forgiveness.
This nonduality is enacted in the Gospels by the Son of Man who dined 
with and was a friend of sinners, prostitutes, and tax collectors.33 Religious 
grace and energy is not something to be preserved from the impurity and 
messiness of the world, but shows its mettle precisely by being applied in 
the midst of that impurity, patiently working on it. “It is not the healthy but 
the sick who need a physician, and I have come not to call the righteous but 
sinners.”34 The bodhisattva is drawn to sin as the physician is to illness, for 
it is the locus of the full deployment of his forces and also the place where 
he comes into vital contact with suffering humanity (or sentient beings in 
general).
Identity
Śāriputra asks: “Goddess, how long ago did you arrive in this house?”35 
The question presupposes the ordinary understanding of the identity of 
persons and their location in space and time. It is just this kind of ques-
tion that lies exposed to the transcendental deconstructions that Buddhism 
likes to inflict. The goddess’s answer—“I have been here since the moment 
that Śāriputra the Elder entered deliverance”—like the answers of Jesus to 
33 Mk 2:15–16; Mt 9:10–11; Lk 5:29–30; 7:37–9; 15:2; 19:7.
34 Mk 2:17; Mt 9:12; Lk 5:31.
35 Takahashi 2006, chapter 6, section 9.
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his interlocutors in the Synoptics and also in the Fourth Gospel, throws the 
question back on the questioner, showing that his question is really about 
himself.
Śāriputra repeats his question: “Goddess, has it been a long time since 
you arrived in this house?” and again the reply throws him back on himself: 
“Has it been a long time since Śāriputra attained liberation?” Śāriputra is 
struck dumb, because he understands that liberation, vimukti, cannot appro-
priately be spoken of in mundane temporal categories.36 Pressed as to the 
reason for his silence, he answers: “Since deliverance is inexpressible I do 
not know what to say about it.” Has he thus attained the wisdom expressed 
later in the sutra by Vimalakīrti in his famous silence about the nature of 
nonduality? Is his statement that deliverance is inexpressible comparable to 
the similar statement of Mañjuśrī about nonduality? Apparently not, for the 
goddess goes on to correct him, pointing out that deliverance is not beyond 
language: “The phonemes pronounced by the Elder are all characters of 
vimukti. Why? This vimukti is neither inside nor outside nor other than either. 
Phonemes likewise are neither inside nor outside nor other than either. Thus, 
venerable Śāriputra, do not speak of a deliverance beyond phonemes. Why? 
Because the identity of all dharmas constitutes vimukti.”37 Contrary to older 
Buddhist teachings, it is not only the realm of vimukti that is unspeakable, 
but even such mundane matters as the duration of the goddess’s residence 
in the house. Hence, the realm of speech and the realm of the unspeakable 
coincide. The scene of Vimalakīrti’s silence in chapter 8 raises the question 
of a nonduality between that silence and Mañjuśrī’s speech about it. Here 
Śāriputra’s silence does not receive much credit from the goddess, since 
it is caught in dualistic discrimination between mundane dharmas and the 
pure realm of vimukti.
Śāriputra objects that vimukti is the destruction of the three poisons, which 
cannot be seen as equal to wholesome dharmas. She replies: “It is for those 
who have gone astray that the Buddha said: ‘The destruction of attachment, 
aversion, and folly, that is what is called deliverance.’ But for those who have 
not gone astray he taught that attachment, aversion, and folly are themselves 
deliverance.”38 For the reader acclimatized to the paradoxes of this text, her 
reply is almost predictable. A therapist of the three poisons might aim at get-
ting the patient to see how empty they are, such that they thus lose their hold. 
36 Cf. Lamotte 1987, p. 273: “The oldest texts recognize that nothing can be said of the 
one who has ‘gone’ (cf. Suttanipāta, v. 1076).”
37 Takahashi 2006, chapter 6, section 9.
38 Ibid.
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In their self-deconstruction they become deliverance. But the goddess appears 
to be making a more radical point. Deliverance has pitched its tent amid the 
three poisons, not at a sanitized distance from them. Bodhisattva existence is 
not a flight from the three poisons but their transformation from within.
It is identity-fixation rather than monkish sexism that the goddess’s answer 
targets: “In the twelve years I have dwelt in this house, I have sought my 
female nature, but without ever gaining it. How then could I change it? . . . All 
dharmas are unreal and of a nature created by magic, and you would think 
of asking them to change their female nature?”39 Both are empty and illu-
sory, and Śāriputra is suffering from fixation on an alleged substantial iden-
tity. The conviction of emptiness opens a space where the miraculous can 
occur. “Then the goddess put forth such a supernatural action that the Elder 
Śāriputra appeared in the very likeness of the goddess and she appeared in 
the very likeness of Śāriputra. Then the goddess changed into Śāriputra asked 
Śāriputra changed into a goddess: ‘Why then, Reverend, do you not change 
your feminine nature?’” She then quotes the Buddha: “Dharmas are neither 
male nor female”40—an insight that can be extended to all oppositions.
In the Śūraṃgamasamādhi-sūtra the devaputra Gopaka is asked by what 
good action he changed his female body and he replies: “Those engaged in 
the Great Vehicle do not see a difference between male and female. . . . The 
notions of man and woman are fabricated by the imagination.” The good 
action that merited his sex change is his former service of Śākyamuni. “If 
my body now is that of a man, this does not mean that I have destroyed or 
abandoned the characteristics of the female body. . . . Man and woman are 
misconceptions, and so are all dharmas; they are absolutely free of dual-
ity.”41 No doubt such blithe transcendental non-discrimination, like the “nei-
ther male nor female” of St. Paul,42 can coexist in practice with entrenched 
discriminatory customs.
Śāriputra’s identity as leading disciple of the Buddha, as monk, as male, 
as individual, weighs on him. He carries his religious creed as a burden, and 
its relationship to his lived existence is an uneasy one. This heap of invest-
ments in identity and doctrine has the same oppressive role as the Law in 
St. Paul; what can free Śāriputra is awakening to emptiness. To be sure, 
the rhetoric of nonduality could be perverted into a magnificent instrument 
for leaving all inequalities entrenched and unchallenged, especially once 
39 Takahashi 2006, chapter 6, section 14.
40 Ibid., section 15.
41 Lamotte 1975, pp. 174–75.
42 Gal 3:28.
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these inequalities have been dubbed conventional and are thus all the more 
embraced. Something similar is true of the rhetoric of justification by faith.
The goddess cites the Buddha: dharmas are “neither made nor non-made, 
na kṛtā na vikṛtāḥ.”43 Female nature has no real existence, so it is neither 
made nor unmade, and the same is true of all dharmas. The absence of fixed 
identities allows tremendous flexibility in adopting different unreal identities 
as skillful means. Paul wrote: “I have become sick to the sick that I might 
gain the sick; I have become all things to all men that I might save all.”44 
Paul crosses the boundaries between Jew and Gentile, and Vimalakīrti has 
such total freedom from self that he can cross all boundaries, led by the 
generous desire to lead all to happiness. Whatever the ontological riddles of 
nonduality in any of its versions, it seems that there is a fundamental prac-
tice that makes the two religions one. This consists in the relinquishment of 
all selfish clutching at one’s own identity, so that the mind-forged barriers 
that keep one from embracing the other in a spirit of inclusive community 
fall away.
The theme of nonduality remains a very puzzling one. The above remarks 
are an indication of the kind of reflection that arises when one moves to and 
fro between the language of the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa and that of the New Tes-
tament. If this kind of two-way reflection gets underway, I suggest that it will 
be a source of religious and philosophical insights for a long time, generating 
a higher wisdom in which the Buddhist and Christian voices will increas-
ingly blend.
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